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Executive summary 
Hong Kong is renowned for the international status of its financial centre. Yet, the 
financial regulatory system and compensation scheme are not comprehensive 
enough to deal with global financial crises. This dissertation is going to examine 
the ex ante and ex post measures for this purpose in Hong Kong and analyze them 
in accordance to international standard. The research is trying to find out possible 
Hong Kong financial response to crises is a national one and lacks of a bank 
resolution regime in case of banks failure. The dissertation concludes by giving 
suggestions to the financial reform in respective areas and the importance of 
harmonious relationship between ex ante and ex post measures in providing a 
comprehensive regulatory and legal regime to deal with banking crises. 
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1. CHAPTER ONE: Introduction 
 
This paper is going to discuss the banking crises in Hong Kong. It analyses the 
regulatory ex ante measures to prevent financial failure and ex post compensation 
scheme which is comprised of bailout, deposit insurance and insolvency laws to 
maintain the public confidence in banks and minimize the monetary loss to the 
taxpayers and depositors. It is going to firstly examine the impact of global financial 
crises on Hong Kong and the experience in dealing with the collapse of the 
internationally active banks. Following that is the discussion of realizing the financial 
market which is becoming an international integrated market under the influence of 
forces of globalization whereas the financial regulation is limited to national regulation 
and subsequently it cannot provide a sufficient response to the global financial crises.  
 
After understanding the global trend, it is going to analyze if Hong Kong financial 
regulatory structure is capable enough to resist the global financial crises by exploring 
its weakness and comparing its preventative and compensation measures with 
international standards. Suggestions on preventative measures will be given which are 
evidentially supported by the regulators in Hong Kong. In regard to the ex post 
measures, three types of compensation scheme, which are bailout, deposit insurance 
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and insolvency laws will be critically examined and analysed, for instance if Hong 
Kong cross-border insolvency framework meet the conditions for handling the effects 
of the international financial crises. The dissertation will be concluded by emphasizing 
the importance of harmonious relationship between ex ante and ex post measures. 
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2. CHAPTER TWO: Hong Kong v. Global Financial Crises 
 
This chapter discusses the impact of the collapse of internationally active banks in 
Hong Kong and how Hong Kong government and legal system react to the financial 
crises, in particular the insolvency of internationally active banks. 
 
2.1. The Collapse of Internationally Active Banks such as Lehman 
Brothers in the US and its impact on Hong Kong Financial 
Markets 
 
 Hong Kong has experienced twice the collapse of Internationally Active Banks. They 
are Bank of Credit & Commerce International (‘BCCI’) and Lehman Brothers Holding 
Limited (‘LB’). Their impacts were enormous to the banking system and financial 
market in Hong Kong. 
 
In July 1991, one of the substantial retail banks, Bank of Credit and Commerce Hong 
Kong (BCCHK) was closed.
1
 BCCHK is a direct subsidiary of the BCCI and is owned 
                                                        
1 Raymond Li, “Banking Problems: Hong Kong’s experience in the 1980s” (1999) BIS Policy Paper, 
Bank for International Settlements 133 
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by the Government of Abu Dhabi. Around 40,000 depositors with HK$10.85 billion in 
deposits were seriously affected. Numerous people conducted demonstration on the 
street in request for the refunds and urged Hong Kong government to bail out BCCHK. 
The bank failure also triggered bank run on other four banks in Hong Kong, including 
Standard Chartered and Citibank. A survey found out that 28% of Hong Kong 
interviewers had no confidence on the banking system during that time. On the other 
hand, such disaster negatively affected the financial market in Hong Kong. The Hang 
Seng Index plummeted. The Government responded by injecting $60 million into the 
banking system.
2
 After several rescue attempts had been failed due to the many 
unrecorded liabilities, the Hong Kong court finally ordered BCCHK to be wound up on 
2 March 1992.
3
 Consequently, most of the depositors in BCCHK received refund 
almost 100% of their money in liquidation.
4
 
 
The failure of BCCHK showed that the liquidation of retail bank did cause substantial 
systemic effect. For instance, bank run damages the public confidence to banks and 
causes financial instability. The problem was even worse when there was no deposit 
insurance scheme during 1991. 
                                                        
2
 Derek Roebuck, S. H. Ko, Philip Lawton, S.W. Leung, Dhirendra K. Srivastava and Peter Tashjian,  
Law Relating to Banking in Hong Kong (Hong Kong University Press, 1994) 307 
3 ibid 308-309 
4 Hong Kong Deposit Protection Scheme, <http://www.dps.org.hk/en/background.html> accessed 12 
August 2013 
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In 2008, Hong Kong encountered another internationally active bank failure which 
contributes to a global financial crisis. The collapse of LB triggers several impacts in 
Hong Kong, including the near failure of American International Group (‘AIG’), 
substantial foreign exchange losses of CITIC Pacific, bank run on Bank of East Asia 
(BEA). 
 
AIG faced the liquidity crisis when LB was bankrupt since it had sold credit protection 
in form of credit default swap (CDSs) on collateralized debt obligations which had 
decreased in value after the collapse.
5
 It also triggered the insurance policyholders of 
its subsidiary AIA (HK) to redeem their policies.
6
 The United States Federal Reserve 
Bank stepped in to prevent the collapse of AIG. Such nationalization avoided 
deterioration of the consequence in Hong Kong during the financial crisis.
7
 
 
The crisis caused the dramatic decline of the Australian dollar against the US dollar in 
foreign exchange markets. CITIC Pacific suffered substantial loss on a structured 
                                                        
5
 Morgenson, Gretchen,"Behind Insurer's Crisis, Blind Eye to a Web of Risk" (NY Times, 29 September 
2008) <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/28/business/28melt.html> accessed 13 August 2013 
6 Arner, Douglas W., Hsu, B.F.C. and Da Roza, Antonio M. , “Financial regulation in Hong Kong: Time 
for a change” (2010) 5(1) Asian Journal Of Comparative Law 1, 14 
7 ibid 
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derivatives contract “accumulators”.8 It also affected the bank run on BEA which was 
the Hong Kong’s fifth biggest bank during that time. The bank run began after BEA had 
revealed its substantial losses in equity derivatives. It was settled when HKMA 
announced the HKDPS will fully coverage the deposit of banks in Hong Kong.
9
 
 
After LB filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 of US Bankruptcy Code, the 
Hong Kong stock market fell abruptly and Hang Seng Index fell below 16,500.
10
 
Besides, eight LB entities in Hong Kong (‘LBHK’) were put into liquidation, including 
Lehman Brothers Asia Limited (‘LBAL’) which was the arranger for LB structured 
products sold in Hong Kong, i.e. Minibonds.
11
 According to information of the HKMA, 
LB structured products were sold around HK$20.23 billion to over 43,700 investors 
through retail banks, including HK$11.2 billion in Minibonds held by about 33,600 
investors.
12
 They were distributed by 16 retail banks and several securities brokers.
13
 
                                                        
8 ibid 
9 “HK Monetary Authority informs about changes in Deposit Protection Scheme” (Hong Kong 
Financial News, 16 September 2010) 
<http://hongkongfinancialnews.wordpress.com/2010/09/16/hk-monetary-authority-informs-about-cha
nges-in-deposit-protection-scheme/> accessed 10 August 2013 
10Bank of China (Hong Kong), “The Hong Kong Economy in the Shock of the Lehman Wave”, (HKTDC 
Research, 30 September 2008) 
<http://economists-pick-research.hktdc.com/business-news/article/Economic-Forum/The-Hong-Kong
-Economy-in-the-Shock-of-the-Lehman-Wave/ef/en/1/1X000000/1X0022P5.htm> accessed 10 
August 2013 
11Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region ,“Report of the Subcommittee to 
Study Issues Arising from Lehman Brothers-related Minibonds and Structured Financial 
Products” (June 2012) 22  [Subcommittee Report] 
<http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr08-09/english/hc/sub_com/hs01/report/hs01_rpt.htm> accessed 1 August 
2013 
12 Hong Kong Monetary Authority, “Report of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority on Issues 
Concerning the Distribution of Structured Products connected to Lehman Group Companies” (31 
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Once the insolvency of the LB occurred, the Minibond-holders would only be limited 
to realize the collateral which could be less than the principal invested amount. 
 
Besides the negative impact to the financial market and economy of Hong Kong after 
the collapse of LB, it also affected the innocent investors who were misled by the banks 
staff that these financial products were safe and of low risk. However, the relevant 
prospectuses of Minibonds and other LB structured products states that they were not 
suitable for all investor or inexperienced investors. Some of these products were 
offered by way of private placement to ensure that the purchasers were sophisticated 
investors with experience in these matters.
14
 As a consequence, the retail investors 
suffered tremendous loss and doubted whether sufficient regulations had been worked 
out in supervising the conduct of the bank advisers in selling LB Minibonds. 
 
In short, the impact of the collapse of internationally active banks in Hong Kong affects 
significantly the financial market as well as the public. Bank run reflects that the public 
confidence towards the banking system in Hong Kong is not strong enough whenever 
banking crises arise. Lack of liquidity among banks is another obvious problem where 
                                                                                                                                                              
December 2008) [HKMA review report] 
<http://www.hkma.gov.hk/media/eng/doc/other-information/lehman_report.pdf> accessed 1 August 
2013 
13 Subcommittee Report (n 11) para. 2.6 
14 Ibid, para. 2.17 
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the Government has to inject substantial capital to stabilize the banking system. Most 
importantly, the financial regulation is not comprehensive enough to strengthen public 
confidence in banks when there are financial crises, including conduct of sales by bank 
staffs and compensation scheme in resolving banks. 
 
2.2. Hong Kong exposure to International Banks’ failures  
  
Hong Kong does not have a resolution statutory regime or insolvency laws for 
International banks. BCCI and LB were liquidated under the Hong Kong Bankruptcy 
Ordinance (cap 6) 1931 which is based on the United Kingdom Bankruptcy Act 1914. 
Generally, Hong Kong courts will recognize a foreign liquidation that is granted under 
the law of the jurisdiction of the company’s incorporation.15 Foreign companies can be 
wound up in Hong Kong pursuant to Section 327 of the Hong Kong Companies 
Ordinance (‘CO’) provided that a sufficient connection with the jurisdiction is shown 
and there is a “reasonable possibility of benefit for the creditors from winding up”, the 
court has jurisdiction to wind up the foreign company under the common law.
16
  
 
                                                        
15 Re Irish Shipping [1985] H.K.L.R. 437, 439 
16 Re A Company (No. 00359 of 1987) [1988] Ch. 210 
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2.2.1. Hong Kong Insolvency Law and cases studies 
 
A company is allowed to be organized or restructured under section 166 of Companies 
Ordinance
17
 (‘CO’) in Hong Kong. When a company is under the process of 
bankruptcy, a liquidator will be employed and has the power to propose a compromise 
or arrangement between the company and its creditors or shareholders.
18
 However, it 
rarely happened in Hong Kong. The reason is that secured creditors are reluctant to 
modify their rights regarding the veto power over the restructuring process. More 
problems may appear in transnational insolvency cases. Foreign courts may refuse to 
recognize under S166 of CO as it might modify or discharge contracts that are governed 
by non-Hong Kong law. Hence, it is suggested that the scheme needs to be proposed in 
all affected jurisdictions.
19
 
 
2.2.1.1. Bank of Credit and Commerce Hong Kong (‘BCCHK’) 
 
On 8 July 1991, the Financial Secretary of Hong Kong presented a petition to wind up 
BCCHK. The winding up petition was filed under Section 53(1)(c)(iii) of Hong Kong 
                                                        
17 Cap. 32 
18 Section 237 and 254 of Companies Ordinance (Cap 32) 
19 Booth, C D., “The Transnational Aspects of Hong Kong Insolvency Law” (1995) 2(1) Southwestern 
Journal of Law and Trade in the Americas 46, 48-9 
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Banking Ordinance (‘HKBO’). The Official Receiver was appointed as the provisional 
liquidator. On 1 September 1991, the Hong Kong Chinese Bank (‘HKCB’) which was a 
subsidiary of Indonesia’s Lippo Group indicated an interest to take over BCCHK. At 
last, HKCB abandoned its action due to the massive unrecorded liabilities which Abu 
Dhabi and Hong Kong governments would not guarantee.
20
 On March 1992, the Hong 
Kong High Court ordered the winding up of BCCHK.  
 
During the winding up, a scheme of arrangement was proposed under S 166 of the CO. 
It was the obligation of BCCHK to pay full claims to all unsecured creditors who were 
owned less than HK$100,000. The scheme was approved by creditors and was 
sanctioned by the Hong Kong High Court in September 1992.
21
 One year later, 
BCCHK was awarded judgment in New York to transfer US$25 million to Hong Kong 
for distribution in the Hong Kong liquidation.
22
 In March 1994, BCCHK’s unsecured 
creditors received the full payment according to the scheme while those owned more 
the HK$100,000 received 64% of their claims.
23
 According to Mr. Eddie Middleton, 
the liquidator of both BCCHK and LB in Hong Kong, the creditors of the BCCHK were 
                                                        
20 Srivastava D.K., “The Collapse of the Bank of Credit and Commerce Hong Kong: Internal Failure or 
System Failure” (1991) 1 Australian J. Corp. L. 170-172 
21 BCCHK Scheme of Arrangement and Attached Explanatory Statement (6 August 1992) 
22 Gren Manuel, “BCCHK Wins US$25m Cash Ruling”, South China Morning Post, (10 September 
1993)  
23 Annual Departmental Report of the Hong Kong Official Receiver 1993-1994 P. 9 
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paid in full by 1998.
24
 Until 26 March 2013, all the entities of BCCL were finally 
dissolved.
25
  
 
2.2.1.2. Lehman Brothers entities in Hong Kong (‘LBHK’) 
 
In September 2008, eight Hong Kong companies in the LB filed winding up petitions to 
the court according to Section 179(1) of the CO. Applications were also made for the 
appointment of provisional liquidators pursuant to Section 193 of the CO. They were 
approved on 17 September 2008. Winding up order was made in November 2008. Four 
months later, the provisional liquidators became liquidators of LB in Hong Kong. In the 
same month, they applied to the court in seeking the direction on the assessment of 
remuneration and disbursements.  
 
The court ordered that during the provisional period, which was from their appointment 
to the date of appointing as liquidators, the provisional liquidators and their agents were 
subject to 75% of the amount sought as an interim payment while 100% of their other 
                                                        
24 Hong Kong Institute of Certified Public Accountants, “Liquidating Lehman: How KPMG is tackling 
the world’s largest bankruptcy” (2010) 6(5) Driving Business Success 26 
25 Andrew Bolton, “ Liquidation lessons – what BCCI’s wind-down tells us about the post-Lehman 
world” (Legal Week, 21 Jun 2013) 
<http://www.legalweek.com/legal-week/analysis/2275442/liquidation-lessons-what-bccis-winddow
n-tells-us-about-the-postlehman-world> accessed 5 August 2013 
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disbursements.
26
 In regarding the assessment of remuneration, the court concluded that 
it had the inherent jurisdiction to determine the assessment of provisional liquidation 
throughout the periods before and after the granting of winding-up order on the basis of 
the Maxwell principles
27
. The court was also empowered to appoint a suitably assessor 
to assist in the determination of the fees. Due to the complexity of the liquidation of LB, 
the court was allowed exercising its power to appoint assessor and remained the final 
decisions on the fees rather than Tax Registry.
28
 
 
2.2.2. International cooperation – protocol meetings 
 
In May 2009, 10 Official Representatives including Hong Kong signed a Cross-Border 
Insolvency Protocol for the Lehman Brothers Group of Companies (‘LB Protocol’).29 
It is a nonbinding agreement which aims to share information and data, to facilitate 
communication, to coordinate the multiple proceedings in different countries and to 
find consensual and negotiated solutions to the unique problems arising from 
international insolvency proceedings.
30
 The ultimate goal is to maximize efficiency 
                                                        
26
 Lehman Brothers Securities Asia Ltd (No 2) [2010] HKLRD 58 
27 Re Peregrine Investments Holdings Ltd (No 1)[1998] 3 HKC 1 CFI 
28
 Lehman Brothers Securities Asia Ltd (No 2) [2010] HKLRD 58 
29 Hong Kong Institute of Certified Public Accountants, “Liquidating Lehman: How KPMG is tackling 
the world’s largest bankruptcy” (2010) 6(5) Driving Business Success 25 
30 Cross-border Insolvency Protocol for the Lehman Brothers Group of Companies 
<http://www.globalturnaround.com/cases/Lehman%20Protocol.pdf> accessed 6 August 2013 
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and minimize dispute among debtors, creditors and tribunals from the entire world.
31
  
 
Scholar suggested that the protocol should be based on the United Nations Commission 
on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvencies as 
statutory solutions to international insolvency problems.
32
 Nonetheless, Mr. Middleton 
thinks that litigation was unavoidable because it was very difficult to reach a common 
consensus in particular to those terms that would expose risks to potential claims and 
liabilities to the creditors and to the court.
33
 Yet, the group had come up with some 
huge achievements on reaching consensus on the use of Lehman’s books as a basis for 
intercompany claims and on a valuation methodology for intercompany trades such as 
stock loans, over-the-counter derivatives and repos.
34
 
 
2.2.3. Cooperation with SFC and the LB parent company in US 
 
Besides the international cooperation in dealing with group insolvencies, liquidators for 
LBHK also have to cooperate with regulators. In August 2009, the High Court ruled 
                                                        
31 Official Representatives and other Participating Affiliates Pursuant to the Cross-Border Insolvency 
Protocol for the Lehman Brothers Group of Companies: Report of Activities (15 January 2010) 
<http://www.ekvandoorne.com/files/official-representatives-report.pdf> accessed 6 August 2013 
32 Jamie Altman, “A test case in international bankruptcy Protocols: The Lehman Brothers Insolvency” 
(2010-2011) 12 San Diego Int'l L.J. 463, 465 
33 Hong Kong Institute of Certified Public Accountants (n 29) 26 
34 ibid. 
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that Lehman Brothers Asia Ltd (in liquidation) must disclose records to the SFC for its 
investigation of the offer and marketing of Minibonds.
35
 Due to the complexity of the 
corporate structure, it is necessary to settle the claims within groups. In 2011, Hong 
Kong liquidators for Hong Kong reached an agreement settling all intercompany claims 
with Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. in the U.S.
36
 
 
To conclude, the collapse of BCCHK and LBHK posed significant effect in Hong Kong, 
such as public confidence in banks. It also reflected the incomprehensive of the 
preventative financial regulation and compensation scheme. A clear and sound bank 
resolution regime is not adopted. Legal areas in relation to the bank insolvency are still 
left the court or legislation to solve, such as assessment of remuneration and 
disbursements to liquidators. Internationally active banks operate on a global basis, as 
well as insolvency. Hence, international cooperation is also crucial even though it is 
challenging and difficult. 
  
                                                        
35 Securities and Futures Commission, “High Court rules Lehman Brothers must turn over documents to 
SFC” (Hong Kong, 21 August 2009) 
<http://www.sfc.hk/edistributionWeb/gateway/EN/news-and-announcements/news/doc?refNo=09P
R116> accessed 14 August 2013 
36 Nina Mehra, “Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. and Lehman Hong Kong Entities Reach Settlement” (3 
August 2011) 
<http://eon.businesswire.com/news/eon/20110803007141/en/agreement/lehman/settlement> 
accessed 14 August 2013 
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3. CHAPTER THREE: International Financial Crises and 
Limits of National Regulatory Measures 
    
3.1. The markets are international 
The financial markets are interconnected and they are easily affected by problems arise 
from any countries. From Latin American debt crisis in 1980s to the global financial 
crisis in 2008, the consequences of the crisis shows that the world markets are more 
interconnected and liberated than before. In Latin American debt crisis, the 
announcement of the declaration from Mexico of the incapability in repaying the debts 
triggered the proliferation of other debt crises in Latin America, such as Brazil, 
Venezuela, and Argentina. In 1997 Asian financial crisis, the currency crisis in 
Thailand spread through other Asian countries, like Indonesia, Hong Kong, Singapore. 
2008 subprime mortgage crisis in US affected the financial markets around the world. 
Thus, financial crisis becomes more difficult to solve as it would spread speedily under 
the international trading markets. 
 
Financial markets are interlocking networks that involve foreign exchange, securities, 
commodities and other fungible items of value at low transaction costs and at prices 
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that reflect supply and demand. Market can be called as the “Network Society” which 
functions to trade and exchange ideas, goods and services.
37
 Under the effect of 
globalization, financial markets have integrated to be an international market. Any 
institutional failure can be seen as network failure. Any shock or negative effect quickly 
spread through the world through contagion. However, the relevant policy and 
regulations are usually national, without considering the international perspectives. In 
fact, the markets are interconnected and interdependence. A national crisis can transmit 
globally to the networked world.
38
  
 
Financial crises usually begin with the failure of a national market. This failure is 
quickly contagious to other markets or other regions in the world. In Latin American 
crisis in 1980s, the crisis began with the incapability of repaying the debt in Latin 
America region as Mexico’s default. In Asian financial crisis in 1997, the crisis began 
with the collapse of currency market in Thailand. In 2008 global financial crisis, the 
crisis was triggered by the collapse of the internationally active bank in the US. All 
these crises spread globally in a short time. 
 
                                                        
37 Sheng, Andrew, From Asian to global financial crisis: an Asian regulator's view of unfettered finance 
in the 1990s and 2000s (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 8  
38 ibid 8-10 
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The crises were regionally concentrated, such as Latin America and Asian regions. 
They gradually became cross-regional due to the strong economic and institutional 
linkages among financial markets or the dramatic impact by the region with large 
economic power. For instance, Japan lent huge amount of loans to Latin America for 
their oil-exploiting business or infrastructure. Hence, Japan had a strong economic 
linkage with Latin America. On the other hand, Latin American debt crisis was heavily 
influenced by economic policies of U.S. who had the strong economic power during 
that time. In Asian crisis, it demonstrated the close economic linkage and 
interdependence among Asian countries. Therefore, 2008 crisis illustrated the world 
economy became an integration of world financial markets. 
 
3.2. The contagious effect of the financial crises 
 
3.2.1. Latin American Debt crisis  
 
In 1980s, Latin America debt crisis resulted from the incapability of Latin 
America and other developing countries in repaying their huge international debts. 
The failure was in relation to the rapid growth in the world economy that attracted 
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U.S. investment in new developing countries. At the same time, the third world 
developing countries showed speedily growth trading in oil, material and agricultural 
goods. They required financial assistance in building these businesses and began to 
borrow large loan from international banks on capital markets. Most of the loans 
were sovereign and the amount became double in three years. The crisis was 
triggered from the increasing interest rates set by the Federal Reserve as to combat 
the oil-based inflation. Since their loans were linked to London Interbank Offering 
Rate (‘LIBOR’), their debt-service costs grew dramatically. The problem spread 
quickly to the other countries after the Mexico’s declaration of inability to repay its 
international debt. As a result, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank had to intervene and rescue them.
39
 
 
3.2.2. 1997 Asian Financial Crisis 
1997 Asian financial crisis began by the asset bubbles and the rapid grow of 
economy which led to increasing real estate price and conducting many foreign direct 
investment and public infrastructure projects. As a result, they borrowed huge amount 
of loans from banks. In order to control the inflation, the United States Federal Reserve 
raised its interest rates. Due to the fluctuation of property market in Thailand, the 
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currency traders, or called speculators, started attacking the Thai baht’s peg to the U.S. 
dollar. As Thailand has limited foreign currency reserve, the Thai Government was 
forced to float baht and resulting in slumping. Such devaluation spread through other 
Asian countries, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Japan, South Korea and 
Russia.
40
 Although most of the governments of Asia had seemingly sound fiscal 
policies, the IMF stepped in to initiate a $40 billion program to stabilize the currencies 
of South Korea, Thailand and Indonesia which economies were hit by this financial 
crisis.
41
 
 
3.2.3. 2008 Global Financial Crisis 
 
The latest global financial crisis happened in 2007-2008. Similar to Asian financial 
crisis, it began with the existence of asset bubbles, excessive lending and leverage, 
inadequate supervision on innovative structured products selling to investors. The 
formation of housing bubbles and the leverage was from the process of securitization 
which is the repackaging the mortgage loans bought from the mortgage issuers and 
becoming mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDO) 
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41 Frontline, “Timeline of the panic” (PBS) 
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/crash/etc/cron.html> accessed 17 August 2013 
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which were sold to investors around the world. The investments were therefore 
leveraged up to 30 to 40 times comparing to their investment. Consequently, as the 
number of houses sold reached the peak and the house price dropped, many of the 
borrowers started defaulting on their mortgages loans. Many subprime lenders filed for 
bankruptcy, including Lehman Brothers. Other investment banks were either sold to 
other banks or bailed out by the U.S. federal government, resulting in downturns in 
stock markets around the world. Consequently, it affects the entire world significantly. 
 
3.3. The response to international financial crises is national 
response 
  
Despite the contagious effect to other nations or regions, the responses, whether ex ante 
preventive regulation or ex post compensation schemes, towards crises are different in 
various countries.
 42
 Affected nations came out with their own bailout package by their 
own government and conducted relevant financial regulatory reform. Some countries 
sought help from international organizations. 
 
In 2008 financial crisis, the U.S. government enacted National Economic Stabilization 
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Act of 2008 for the purpose of collecting billions of money to purchase MBS. It acts 
like to bailout in the financial system.  In Asian financial crisis, the affected countries 
sought help and borrowed loan from International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. 
In return, these countries were requested to adhere to strict conditions, such as cutting 
public spending, higher taxes and interest rates, even to close the troubled financial 
institutions. Despite the rigorous protests by the public, the plan turns out to be 
effective when the economy gradually recovered from the crisis and even growth 
during 2008 financial crisis.
43
 
 
Latin America was unable to repay the debt and therefore they turned to IMF who 
required Latin America to make economic reforms that favoured free-market 
capitalism
44
 and adopted austerity plans. Even though they had caused the economy of 
Latin America suffered at the beginning, the recovery was significant and the economy 
was still growing after 2008 global financial crisis according to the World Bank 
report.
45
 
 
                                                        
43 The World Bank, “Latin America will grow in 2013 despite global crisis” (18 April 2003) 
<http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2013/04/18/economia-latinoamerica-2013> accessed 
17 July 2013 
44 Manuel Pastor, "Latin America, the Debt Crisis, and the International Monetary Fund" (1989) 16(1) 
Latin America’s Debt and the World Economic System 79 
45 The World Bank (n 43) 
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3.4. The necessity of International Corporation due to insufficient 
national response 
 From the fact that the crisis is happening one after another, it can be proved that the 
responses to the crises were not sufficient. The national regulatory efforts, monetary 
policies and bailout solutions can only settle the appearing problem nationally. It does 
not solve the root causes of the crises and the contagious effect it brought to the whole 
world.
 46
 
 
In 2008 Global financial crisis, many countries adopted unilateral actions against the 
crisis. The government spent billions of dollars to bailout the troubled banks due to ‘too 
big to fail’ theory and purchased all the MBS from the investors for the sake of settling 
the problems in short term only. Despite the fact that some nations take effort in 
regulatory reforms which is based on international principles, it is not sufficient for 
only a few nations to take such reform against global financial crisis. International 
cooperation is required but it does not exist at the moment. 
 
International cooperation is required to prevent financial crises in long term. IMF and 
the World Bank are not regarded as one of the kinds of setting model of international 
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financial system. However, financial regulations have been developed through soft-law 
bodies, such as Basel Committee, International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO), International Association of Insurance Supervisors (‘IAIS’) 
and financial Stability Board (FSB). However, only the members of the organizations 
are obliged to take the measures. Since 2008 crisis, realizing that the financial market is 
highly interconnected, it is necessary to set a platform to address the interdisciplinary 
nature of the financial crisis.
47
 FSB now have to monitor the global financial stability 
and promote reforms. Despite the fact that it becomes a global financial regulatory 
group, it is still yet to include all the nations in this group.  
 
The cross-border contagious effect can be reduced in short term by contingency 
monetary policy with the consultations of central banks. However, in longer run, the 
cooperation in G20 is not sufficient to reduce the probability of future crisis. Therefore, 
the international cooperation with the developing countries has to be considered. 
Global standards for prudential supervision and financial regulations are required. 
More cooperation has to be attained in order to monitor and enforce these standards in 
order to achieve a stable and healthy global financial market.
48
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48 Ralph C. Bryant, “International Cooperation for the financial crisis” (Brookings, 2 October 2008) 
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International collaboration has to be achieved by gathering the nations in acting 
towards the same goal to solve the financial crisis internationally. Such cooperation can 
be emerged when the creditor countries find adequate private returns that can motivate 
them to take actions in crisis management.
49
 The private returns can be substantial 
benefits to their own countries, such as the national financial stability or improving 
bilateral relations with trading partner. Also, it is important to note that the strong 
economic linkage and interdependence with other countries in trading and financial 
activities is also crucial in maintaining the economic stability of their own countries. As 
such, it creates peer pressure to other countries to solve the financial crises 
collectively.
50
 Such practice can improve the harmonious relationship between ex ante 
and ex post measures on a global basis. 
  
                                                                                                                                                              
2013  
49 Saori N. Katada, Banking on Stability: Japan and the Cross-Pacific Dynamics of International 
Financial Crisis Management (The University of Michigan Press, 2001) 210-211 
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4. CHAPTER FOUR: The Readiness of HK Regulatory 
Structure to Face International Crises 
    
4.1.  Overview of Hong Kong Financial Regulatory structure 
 
Hong Kong Financial Regulatory system is a sectoral structure
51
 which separate 
regulators for each financial sector. In Hong Kong, it is comprised of four major sectors. 
They are banking, securities, insurance and pensions. Each sector has its own 
supervisory body.
52
 They are Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA), Securities and 
Futures Commission (SFC), the Office of the Commissioner of Insurance (OCI) and the 
Mandatory Provident Funds Schemes Authority (MPFA) respectively. However, 
banking regulation is institutional which all types of activities conducted by any 
financial intermediary are regulated by one regulator. 
 
The financial regulation is operating under three tiers. The first tier is the Government: 
the Financial Secretary which is to responsible for overall policy, and the Financial 
                                                        
51
 Arner, “Financial Regulation in Hong Kong: Time for a Change” (n 6) 1 
52 Douglas Arner, Berry Hsu and Antonio Da Roza, “The Global Credit Crisis: Implications for Financial 
Regulation in Hong Kong” (Hong Kong Lawyer, 2009) 
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Services and the Treasury Bureau (‘FSTB’) is responsible for turning the strategic 
decision and policies into regulations for entire and individual sectors of the financial 
system.
53
 The second tier is a series of regulatory bodies which each of them operates 
within the framework to issue relevant regulations. The third tier is composed of 
self-regulatory organizations (SROs) which are responsible for overseeing of the 
activities of their members under the supervision of relevant regulatory body. For 
instance, Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited which control and operate the 
stock and future exchange and related clearing houses, is under SFC supervision.
54
 
 
The four regulatory bodies work and supervise independently their respective sectors. 
Nevertheless, in order to enhance the cooperation and coordination between regulators, 
a Cross-Market Surveillance Committee is established to exchange market information 
and to formulate actions together for facilitating the supervision of the financial 
institutions. In 2003, it was divided into two separate committees, Financial Stability 
Committee and the Council of Financial Regulators. The former is to monitor the 
functioning of the financial system in Hong Kong and to deal with the cross-market 
issues and coordinating responses. The latter is to maintain the financial stability and to 
promote the development of financial market in Hong Kong. Additionally, Memoranda 
                                                        
53 ibid 
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of Understanding set out the operational framework for cooperation among regulatory 
bodies and SROs in examining the overlaps and gaps in their roles and responsibly in 
the financial system.
55
 
 
4.2. Regulatory Responses to the 2008 Crisis in HK: a United or 
Divided Response 
 
4.2.1. Injection of capital and related monetary policies to banking system 
 
Immediate response had been taken starting from 27 September 2008. HKMA injected 
HK$24.8 billion actively and HK$54.8billion passively in the banking system after the 
strong-side Convertibility Undertaking was triggered. From 2 October 2008 until the 
end of March 2009, HKMA provided liquidity assistance to licensed banks. On 14 
October, the Financial Secretary announced that the guarantee repayment of all 
deposits held in authorized institutions in Hong Kong.  
 
On 21 November 2008, HKMA announced the adoption of flexible approach on the 
capital adequacy ratio of individual banks. SFC also offered a one-off waiver of the 
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annual license fees from over 37 000 financial intermediaries for one year to help to 
relieve the cost burden on intermediaries during the financial crisis.
56
 Moreover, an 
arrangement was made by HKMA with the People’s Bank of China (‘PBC’) to allow 
Hong Kong subsidiary banks operating in the Mainland China to approach PBC if 
liquidity support was needed.
57
 Hence, HKMA provided immediate liquidity support 
to the banking system in Hong Kong as well as the Hong Kong subsidiary banks in the 
mainland China temporary. HKMA and SFC also laid out measures that favoured banks 
and other financial institutions to alleviate their financial burden.  
 
4.2.2. Receiving investors complaints and investigation 
 
On the other hand, another phenomenon rapidly appeared in Hong Kong. A large 
number of complaints were received by HKMA and SFC after the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers in September 2008 as the investors suffered from significant losses from the 
purchase of Minibonds which were claimed to be misled by the staffs of the distributing 
banks. On 13 October 2008, HKMA had received over 9000 complaints related to 
                                                        
56 Trade and Industry Department, “Measure adopted in response to the Financial Tsunami” (Paper Ref: 
TFEC-INFO-10, 15 June 2009)  
57 Commerce and Economic Development Bureau, Measures adopted in response to the Financial 
Tsunami (Paper Ref: TFEC-INFO-01 ,December 2008) 1-4 
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Lehman Brothers. The number was increased to 21,263 by the end of July 2012
58
. SFC 
received 7,712 complaints against distributing banks.
59
 Therefore, HKMA and SFC 
had to take immediate response to handle and investigate the complaints. 
 
4.2.3. Setting up Financial Dispute Resolution Centre 
 
On 31 October 2008, the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (HKIAC) was 
appointed by the HKMA for the Lehman Brother-related Investment Products Disputes 
Mediation and Arbitration Scheme (LB Mediation and Arbitration Scheme).
60
 It was 
supported and overseen by the HKMA, the SFC and the Legislative Council. The 
scheme aimed to provide mediation and arbitration services to aggrieved investors in 
seeking financial compensation from banks. It involved 11 licensed banks and 
individual investors. If the mediation session was taken unsuccessfully, parties had the 
option of conducting a binding arbitration by HKIAC if both agreed on it.
61
 After a 
                                                        
58 HKMA, “Complaints statistics concerning Lehman-related investment products” (26 July 2012 
updated) 
<http://www.hkma.gov.hk/media/eng/doc/key-information/press-release/2012/20120727e3a1.pdf> 
accessed 22 July 2013 
59 Securities and Futures Commission, “Issue raised by the Lehmans Minibonds crisis: Report to the 
Financial Secretary” (December 2008) [SFC Report] 
<http://www.sfc.hk/web/doc/EN/general/general/lehman/Review%20Report/Review%20Report.pdf 
> accessed 25 July 2013, para 17.2.1 
60
 Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre, “Lehman Brothers-related Investment Products Dispute” 
(31 October 2008) 
61 Darwazeh, Nadia, and Friven Yeoh, "Recognition and Enforcement of Awards under the New York 
Convention - China and Hong Kong Perspectives" (2008) 25(6) Journal of International 
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year of the launch of the Scheme, 243 cases were handled by the Mediation Office. 85 
mediations out of 243 cases were conducted successfully while the remaining cases 
were settled prior to the mediation. The settlement rate of taking part in mediation 
scheme was 85%.
62
  
 
LB Mediation and Arbitration Scheme was proven successfully of adopting mediation 
and arbitration in resolving commercial and financial matter and provided a useful 
experience regarding the future development of a financial dispute resolution 
mechanism. Hong Kong scholar proposed an “In-House Multi-tier Dispute Resolution 
System” for Hong Kong financial institutions for retail investors to seek financial 
redress if they had been mis-sold of financial products by banks and financial 
institutions.
63
 
 
In relation to the Review Reports of HKMA and SFC, they recommended setting up an 
independent dispute resolution mechanism for settling the dispute between the 
investors and financial institutions. After a public consultation conducted in early 2010, 
                                                        
62 Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre, "Mediation 100% Success for Lehman Brothers-Related 
Investment Product Cases" (19 February 2009) 
<http://www.hkiac.org/documents/Mediation/News/090219_LehmanUpdate_E.pdf> accessed 23 
July 2013 
63 Shahla F. Ali, John Koon Wang Kwok, “After Lehman: International Response to Financial Disputes – 
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it was announced in December 2010 that Financial Dispute Resolution Centre (‘FDRC’) 
would be established by mid 2012. FDRC is to administer a financial dispute resolution 
scheme for settling monetary disputes between individual investors and financial 
institution regulated by HKMA and SFC through mediation and arbitration.
64
 
 
4.2.4. Repurchasing of the Minibonds 
 
Despite the losses suffered by the investors, the Financial Secretary re-affirmed and 
made it clear that the Government would not use public money to compensate the 
investors due to unfairness to taxpayers.
65
 Subsequently, on 22 July 2009, SFC, HKMA 
and the 16 Minibonds-distributing banks jointly announced that they had reached an 
agreement to repurchase of Lehman Brother Minibonds from eligible customers after 
the collateral had been recovered.
66
 On 18 July 2013, the SFC and the HKMA 
announced that an agreement with repurchase offer had also been reached with The 
Royal Bank of Scotland in relation to the sale of Lehman Brothers-related equity-linked 
notes to retail clients.
67
 These agreements were declared to be without admission 
                                                        
64 Subcommittee Report (n 11) para 6.22 
65 ibid para 6.5 
66
 Securities and Futures Commission, “SFC, HKMA and 16 banks reach agreement on Minibonds” (22 
July 2009) 
<http://www.sfc.hk/edistributionWeb/gateway/EN/news-and-announcements/news/doc?refNo=09P
R100> accessed 25 July 2013 
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liability. In consideration of the agreements, SFC and HKMA would discontinue its 
investigations into the sale and distribution of Minibonds by the Banks.
68
 
 
4.2.5. Setting up Subcommittee in studying issues relating to 2008 financial crisis 
in Hong Kong 
 
The House Committee of the Legislative Council held meeting on 13 October 2008 and 
agreed that a subcommittee should be set up to study issues arising from Lehman 
Brothers Minibonds and structured financial products.
69
 The authorization was 
delegated from section 9(1) of the Legislative Council (Powers and Privileges) 
Ordinance
70
 to perform the function of the subcommittee. The subcommittee decided 
to focus its study on the regulatory issues and the practice of retail banks in the 
distribution of Lehman Brothers structured products.
 71
 
 
In short, HKMA and SFC worked closely together to respond the financial crisis in 
2008 to stabilize the banking system and handling the complaints. The establishment of 
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sub-committee is to further investigate the regulatory issues and the cause of the 
mis-selling structured products to retail investors for the improvement of the Hong 
Kong regulatory system with recommendations. Therefore, the regulatory responses in 
Hong Kong could be said as unified and worked together in maintaining the financial 
stability. 
 
4.3. The Complexity of the Crises and Simplicity of Hong Kong 
Regulation 
 
The crises happened in Hong Kong are usually influenced by foreign countries, for 
instance, Asian financial crisis and the recent 2008 financial crisis. Crises are complex 
issue that comprise of financial market, government policy and economic condition. It 
is even more complex when it affects globally. Therefore, a strong regulation and good 
policy are required to go against the financial crises. After the 2008 financial crisis, it 
shows that Hong Kong financial regulatory system is still full of gaps and flaws that 
contribute to a strong urge for improvement and even structure reform must be 
considered. The subcommittee investigated the recent financial crisis and referred the 
Review reports from HKMA and SFC. They illustrate the weakness of the Hong Kong 
Student No.: 1340727 
Banking Crises and Hong Kong: Regulatory Measures and Compensation Schemes 
(Bailout, Deposit Insurance and Insolvency Laws) 
34 
 
 
 
financial regulatory system. 
 
4.3.1. Weakness of the Hong Kong financial regulatory system 
 
After the crush of 2008 financial crisis in Hong Kong, problems and weakness of the 
current financial regulatory system have been evolved. HKMA supervises regulated 
activities including securities according to the rules and requirements set by SFC. 
However, HKMA does not regulate directly the relevant individual (ReIs) who is 
employed by banks to carry out regulated activities. Therefore, HKMA relied on banks 
to manage them to comply with the regulation. As a result, HKMA failed to detect early 
mis-selling structured products to retail investors among banks. 
 
SFC is the regulator of the securities and futures market in Hong Kong. It does not have 
the power to oversee the regulated activities of banks. SFC has the power to impose 
disciplinary sanctions on registered institutions and ReIs for their regulated activities 
under the Securities and Future Ordinance (‘SFO’)72. However, HKMA is responsible 
for supervising banks, detecting and investigating any non-compliance. Such 
arrangement of regulatory powers between the two regulators is ineffective to regulate 
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Rels and registered institutions. 
 
4.3.1.1. Disclosure-cum-conduct regulation regime 
 
SFC is responsible for administering the disclosure regime and ensuring the 
information disclosed in accordance with the requirements stated in the Third Schedule 
to the CO
73
 which however provides little guidance on information disclosure on 
structured financial products. In addition, the quality of the information is concerned. 
For instance, the information of the prospectus for the Lehman Brothers structured 
products was not easy to understand. Moreover, it is also noted that those products were 
issued by making use of certain exemption under CO which did not require SFC’s 
authorization of their documentation if it is complied with disclosure requirement, such 
as private placement.
74
 
 
4.3.1.2. Conduct regulation at the point of sale 
 
According to the examination done by the Subcommittee, Several deficiencies were 
identified in compliance with regulatory requirements during the sale of Lehman 
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Brothers structured products. They are product due diligence, provision of staff training 
and guidance, knowing your clients and performing suitability assessment on 
customers, how the sales process was conducted by ReIs, the monitoring and internal 
controls put in place by RIs and their complaint-handling systems. For instance, 
inappropriate risk ratings to certain structured products, banks training materials 
containing misleading information.
75
 
 
In short, the Hong Kong financial regulation and regulatory system is far too simple 
than the complexity of the crises. The complexity of structured financial products 
requires more comprehensive regulation to monitor. 
 
4.4. Hong Kong Financial Regulatory System: Fall Short of 
International Standard? 
 
Hong Kong has an important role in the development of international financial standard. 
For instance, Hong Kong is a membership in the Financial Stability Forum. Hong Kong 
is required to keep update with the international regulatory changes as its aims to 
prevent further occurrence of the global financial crises. It can be suggested that Hong 
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Kong has met international standard where HKMA has always been keeping pace with. 
For instance, the Basel rules from Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Most of 
the banks in Hong Kong have reached to more than the required eight percent capital 
ratio.
76
 Recently, HKMA and SFC jointly announced their commitment to comply with 
the new international regulatory standards on financial market infrastructures. It 
includes Principles for financial market infrastructures” issued jointly by the 
Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) of the Bank for International 
Settlements and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) in 
April 2012.
77
  
 
On the contrary, Hong Kong financial system was vulnerable to the global financial 
crises from the past experience. Moreover, after the collapse of LB and the near failure 
of AIG, Hong Kong still lacks of a comprehensive compensation scheme, such as 
weakness of the deposit insurance scheme and mechanism for resolution of banks or 
financial groups failure.
78
 Therefore, it is suggested that Hong Kong should take 
initiative in improving the financial regulatory system with respect to the international 
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standard, rather than being a reactionary approach as a result of crisis.
79
 However, it 
can be argued that financial crises can be unpredictable. Most of the international 
principles and rules are established after the falls happen. Thus, it is important that 
regulations have to be effective and comprehensive, but not by quantity, since many 
regulations create complexity which might dampen the effectiveness.
80
  
 
4.5. Preventative Measures and Suggestions 
 
The Financial Secretary requested SFC
81
 and HKMA
82
 to produce reports in relation 
to the LB incidence. The subcommittee also put forwards recommendations to address 
the issues. They can be classified into six categories: the regulatory regime, conduct of 
business, information and disclosure, risk assessment, dispute resolution and 
compensation mechanism, investor protection and education.
83
 
 
4.5.1. Regulatory Regime  
HKMA recommended that the regulatory framework should be strengthened in order to 
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keep pace with the rapid increase in the variety and complexity of the investment 
products, which could have their origin in other jurisdictions but sold to the public in 
Hong Kong. It further suggested that all aspects of banks’ securities business should be 
placed under HKMA including registration, standard-setting, supervision, investigation 
and sanction.
84
 The coordination between HKMA and SFC should be strengthened to 
set consistent standards of conducts.
85
 
 
SFC observed that the institutional regulation is no longer an optimal structure. It 
therefore recommended the Government should consider if the present financial 
regulatory structure is suitable to facilitate its development and to prevent future 
financial crises.
86
 SFC proposed “Twin Peaks” approach87 where financial stability 
regulation and prudential regulation are enshrined in a single body, while another 
separate body is responsible for the supervision of the product disclose and financial 
market conduct.
88
 SFC thus recommended the Government the take a full regulatory 
review which has already been initiated by Financial Secretary. 
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4.5.2. Conduct of Business 
In regarding to incident of selling Minibonds to retail investors, HKMA recommended 
that banks should make clearer differentiation between traditional deposit-taking 
activities and retail securities business. Several practical measures including the 
physical segregation of banks’ retail securities business from ordinary banking business 
and from banks’ insurance and other investment activities89; be aware of the conflict of 
interest between the staff and customers; making clear the distinction between deposits 
and investments through signs and warnings;  information separation between retail 
customers deposit and investment accounts; making use of deposit-related information 
to target retail customers into investment activities should be prohibited.
90
 
 
SFC had similar recommendations that the operation of banks in selling securities 
should be differentiated from deposit-related service.
91
 It further suggested in dealing 
with the conflict of interest between the seller and customers, any commercial benefits 
should be disclosed during the sales process.
92
 SFC proposed that investors’ claims to 
collateral proceeds should have priority over the counterparty.
93
 Such interaction 
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between the regulatory regime and private right remains weak.
94
 SFC also 
recommended offering investors with appropriate cooling off periods.
95
 
 
The Subcommittee suggested strengthen supervision of registered institutions (RIs) via 
both on-site examinations and off-site surveillance
96
, achieving consistency in 
standards of practice among RIs by setting benchmarks on key requirements
97
, raising 
the minimum academic qualifications of ReIs in selling financial products to 
customers
98
 and to facilitate a structured sales process where requisite steps must be 
completed before the transaction.
99
 
 
4.5.3. Information and Disclosure 
 
HKMA recommended that the disclosure-based system should remain appropriate for 
Hong Kong that is in line with the policy objectives.
100
 SFC had similar approach 
which recommended Hong Kong should maintain the regulatory philosophy of 
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disclosure coupled with conduct regulation of financial intermediaries.
101
 SFC 
suggested that one overall disclosure standard should be established for all offering 
documents
102
, enforceable against the person responsible for the documents
103
, 
reconsidering whether the two public offering regimes should be retained for 
investment products
104
 and examining whether the existing exemptions for SFC 
authorization of offering documents for investments are too broad.
105
 
 
The Subcommittee suggested legislative amendments should be taken place in 
transferring the regulation of the offer of structured financial products from CO to 
Securities and Futures Ordinance (‘SFO’) in May 2011. In such improvement, SFC can 
issue product codes to prescribe structural requirement in accordance to the nature of 
the product.
106
 In regarding to the disclosure regime, it recommended that the current 
disclosure regime should be given to treat customers fairly throughout the produce 
cycle. This approach is called “Treating Customers Fairly” which is introduced by the 
Financial Services Authority (‘FSA’) in the UK.107 
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4.5.4. Risk Assessment 
 
HKMA recommended that the institution should disclose the review of a higher risk 
rating of a product to the customers who is recommended and will purchase the product 
in due course.
108
 The risk assessment is not limited to product, but also to the investors. 
SFC recommended reviewing the appropriate definition of “professional investors”, the 
minimum asset portfolio requirement and assessment criteria under the Code of 
Conduct.
109
 SFC also recommended requirements for Intermediaries to adopt suitable 
criteria for characterizing investors to ensure the suitability of advice of investment 
products for investor.
110
 
 
4.5.5. Dispute Resolution and Compensation 
The Subcommittee suggested that the regulator should be vested with appropriate 
statutory powers to order the payment of compensation, such as compensation to 
aggrieved investors and consideration of disciplinary action.
111
 
 
HKMA recommended that a dispute resolution mechanism should be established for 
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the financial industry along the lines of a financial services ombudsman.
112
 SFC 
recommended that Code of Conduct should be amended to require client agreement to 
specify a right for clients to have their grievances resolved by a dispute resolution 
procedure. The government should review the need for a financial ombudsman for 
dispute resolution.
113
 
 
4.5.6. Investor protection and education 
The disclosure regime and the disclosure requirements under CO were not sufficient to 
protect the investors who did not obtain the key information of the financial product in 
assessing its risks and features. Together with the insufficient conduct regulation at the 
point of sale, the whole system was not comprehensive enough to protect investor.  
 
Therefore, the Subcommittee suggested that the regulators should set some objective 
criteria for determining suitable category of persons in acquiring certain specified 
products. In other words, certain products can only be sold to the designated category of 
investors.
114
 For instance, the guidance issued by the National Association of 
Securities Dealers in US
115
 and TCF initiative of FSA in the UK
116
. Furthermore, it 
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considers that investor protection should be explicitly stated as one of the Monetary 
Authority’s statutory functions under the Banking Ordinance.117 
 
Investor education is also important to convey proper message unequivocally that 
investors should exercise due diligence and should not invest in products that they do 
not understand. SFC and HKMA post the messages online where the elderly and less 
educated persons might not be able to access. Therefore, it is suggested that this 
message should be spread out through main channels of media, such as radio and 
television’s advertisements or programs. SFC should also publish leaflets and flyers to 
prospective investors.
118
 
 
4.6. The Regulatory, Supervision and Enforcement Coordination 
 
Regulatory measures are effective provided that the enforcement system is efficient and 
supervision is sufficient. A proper coordination is necessary and crucial. In Hong Kong, 
for the sake of increasing the linkage between regulators from various sectors, Council 
of Financial Regulators (CFR) and Financial Stability Committee (FSC) are established. 
                                                                                                                                                              
116 ibid para 7.11 
117 ibid para 8.51 
118 ibid para 7.23 
Student No.: 1340727 
Banking Crises and Hong Kong: Regulatory Measures and Compensation Schemes 
(Bailout, Deposit Insurance and Insolvency Laws) 
46 
 
 
 
CFR, which is chaired by Financial Secretary, focus on minimizing the regulatory gaps 
or duplications among the cross-sector regulatory matters. FSC, which is chaired by the 
Secretary for Financial Services and the Treasury, is responsible for the monitoring the 
financial system and developments.
119
 
 
In addition, Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed between regulators in 
order to enhance the cooperation. MoU between HKMA and SFC set out the roles and 
responsibilities of their major functional aspect in the regulatory regime, exchange 
relevant information and notification or referral of relevant matters.
120
 For instance, the 
collaboration between HKMA and SFC in regulating all the financial institutions in 
carrying out regulated activities in Hong Kong. HKMA supervises of the regulated 
activities by banks on day-to day basis while SFC regulates the financial products and 
takes enforcement to any non-compliance with the statutory requirements. 
 
Nevertheless, the present enforcement framework over the RIs’s conduct of regulated 
activities with the exercise of regulatory powers by HKMA, MA and SFC. HKMA 
oversees all the activities of banks, while HKMA is vested with statutory power to 
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investigate suspected breaches of the Code of Conduct and other regulatory 
requirements. Yet, it does not have the power to impose sanctions on RIs. Such power is 
exercised by SFC under SFO after the consultation with HKMA.
121
 Thus, such 
operational complexities are not conductive to effective enforcement. The 
subcommittee report proposed that if the HKMA had the power in enforcing the 
regulatory requirements of the conduct of regulated activities, cases of mis-selling 
relating the Lehman-Brothers structured products to inappropriate investor could have 
been reduced.
122
 
 
4.7. International Cooperation with Regulatory Supervisors 
 
Besides the cooperation and coordination within the regulatory sectors of Hong Kong, 
international cooperation with regulatory supervisors of different jurisdictions are very 
important in consideration of numerous foreign establishment of banks’ subsidiaries 
and branches operating in Hong Kong. HKMA views that the supervision of foreign 
branches or subsidiaries is the joint responsibility between host and home supervisors 
according to the Basel’s Committee’s Core Principles for Effective Banking 
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Supervision.
123
  
 
HKMA relies heavily on the cooperation of other foreign supervisors to ensure 
effective consolidated supervision of banking groups. Such cooperation involves 
information sharing and sharing of supervisory responsibilities. The principle of 
consolidated supervision, as explained in “Principles for the supervision of banks’ 
foreign establishments”124 set by the Basel Committee, is that parent banks and parent 
supervisory authorities monitor the risk exposure and capital ratio of their responsible 
banks and banking groups. This is based on the assumption that financial groups form a 
single economic entity.
125
 
 
 On the other hand, the branches of foreign banks have to follow certain rules as the 
same as locally incorporated banks on statutory liquidity ratio, on-site examinations by 
HKMA. They also have to submit returns for their Hong Kong operations, but not 
capital-based supervisory requirement.
126
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5. CHAPTER FIVE: The Regulatory Failures and Facing 
the Consequences with Compensation Schemes    
 
When ex-ante preventive regulatory measure cannot afford the investors and depositors 
protection against the crises particularly in an international context, a comprehensive 
ex-post compensation schemes should be worked out to act as a strong shield in 
maintaining the public confidence to the financial market. There has to be kind of 
harmony between the regulatory measures and these compensation schemes. The 
compensation scheme includes bailout, deposit insurance and insolvency laws.  
 
Bailout is often used by the government as a way to save the troubled financial 
institution, yet it is not a long term and proper solution as it doesn’t solve the root of the 
problem and excessive use of this scheme creates the moral hazard which can 
encourage the violation of banking and securities regulation. Deposit insurance scheme 
is to guarantee the certain amount of deposit in the banks for the sake of boosting public 
confidence to banks. Cross-border insolvency law is to deal with the insolvency of 
cross-border financial institutions without posing systematic risk on the real economy 
and maintaining the financial stability. 
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5.1. Bailout 
 
Bailout is a kind of government intervention for assisting enterprises to overcome 
financial distress when it is incapable to meet its financial obligation and therefore to 
prevent failure in the near future.
127
It aims to save the entities or industry from collapse. 
It prevents bankruptcy of the enterprise which has systematic effect to the economy and 
society of the country. Bailout protects employees from unemployment and depositors 
during financial crisis. They all can benefit indirectly from the bailout.
128
 
 
However, it raises another issue of moral hazard. Since the failure is compensated 
financially, the incentive in avoiding crisis from happening will be reduced and makes 
the existence of ex post preventive regulatory measures absurd, unless there is a 
harmony between them, though in an international context it would be very difficult to 
have both regulation and compensation schemes in tune. Therefore, a general 
government intervention to bailout the problem institutions would encourage higher 
risk taking which creates huge losses.  
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The scholar suggests that a special bailout policy is necessary to balance the advantage 
of the bailout with a careful consideration of the consequence. A bailout policy should 
be developed when there is absence of crisis. Guidelines should be established as to 
determine in what kind of situation and appropriate time in applying bailout policy 
which can serve the best of the public interest.
129
 On the other hand, scholars argued 
that government bailout was the most important cause of the crisis in 2008, rather than 
the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers.
130
  
 
IMF took part in giving out bailout proposals to many countries which had financial 
distress. In Latin-American debt crisis, few developing countries accepted the bailout 
from IMF with the condition that they had to conduct economic reforms, cut expenses 
through austerity policy and closed down the troubled financial institutions. These 
mandatory reforms were regarded as inhumane which made their people suffered in the 
beginning of the reforms. For instance, high unemployment rate and low economic 
growth. Thus, only few countries received the bailout provided by IMF in Asian 
financial crisis. Another example is the enactment of the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act of 2008 by the U.S. government. It aims primarily in bailing out the 
U.S. troubled financial institutions. These responses have been criticized as an 
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inappropriate use of taxpayer money and such bailout was not successfully preventing 
the contagious effect to the whole world.
131
 Many of the countries were seriously 
suffered from the collapse of the U.S. financial market. Therefore, bailout was not the 
best solution in resolving the crises. It does not work successfully in every crises and 
the side effect of moral hazard has imposed a great potential in triggering a bigger crisis 
in the future.  
 
To regulate the systemic moral hazard after the bailout, scholar suggests a model of 
preventing risk managers from taking excessive risk during investment. It includes two 
ways in achieving this. All asset managers are required to put their own money at risk 
when making trading decisions and the managers will have legal liability to behave 
according to guidelines in managing risks.
132
 This approach might help in monitoring 
the behavior of the investment. At the same time, depositors have to be protected as to 
attain comprehensive measures for compensation scheme. 
  
5.2. Deposit insurance 
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Deposit insurance is a kind of financial safety net for depositors. It can be implicit and 
explicit.
133
 Implicit deposit insurance is the unlimited use of taxpayers’ money to 
subsidy the failed banks and hence provides implicit deposit guarantee to depositors 
whereas explicit deposit insurance is a scheme that provides limited coverage to the 
depositors.
134
 The former one can be happened in assisting the insolvent institutions 
which are too big to fail. The latter one aims to protect small depositors from failed 
insolvent banks.  
 
Explicit deposit insurance has become popular in the recent years. According to 
International Association of Deposit Insurers (IADI), the 2011 Annual Survey results 
showed that the number of countries implementing explicit deposit insurance has been 
increasing since 1974, from 12 in 1974 to 111 in 2011.
135
 
 
Deposit insurance aims at reinforcing the public confidence and minimizes the 
possibility of bank runs in order to maintain the bank stability.
136
 However, the 
empirical results showed that the explicit deposit insurance had stabilizing effect only 
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in short run. The effect would be deteriorating over time and it made no difference of 
whether the explicit deposit insurance is present or not in relation to the likelihood of 
banking crises occurred.
 137
 This is due to the problem of moral hazard resulting from 
full coverage of the insured deposit.  
 
The coverage limit affects the effectiveness of the scheme. If the coverage limit is low, 
the scheme does not work effectively to prevent bank runs. If the coverage limit is high 
or full, the depositors will have low incentive to monitor banks while banks have high 
incentive to take excessive risk in investment since their deposits are guaranteed. It 
contributes to moral hazard. Therefore, higher the deposit insurance coverage will 
intensify the moral hazard problem which entails banking crises in the long run.
138
 For 
instance, the full deposit insurance scheme in Turkey introduced in 1996, encouraged 
bank to behave riskier which resulted in banking crisis in 2001.
139
  
 
During the 2008 financial crisis, most of the countries raised their coverage or full 
deposit guarantee as a temporary measure against the financial turbulence.
140
 Hong 
Kong also adopted the same measure in 2008-2010. Hong Kong Deposit Protection 
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Scheme (HKDPS) was introduced in 2006. In September 2008, there was a bank run 
happened on the Bank of East Asia. HKMA instructed HKDPS to offer full deposit 
insurance coverage as a temporary measure until the end of 2010. As a result, the bank 
run in 2008 was saved by the announcement of full deposit guarantee by the HKDPS.
141
 
Subsequently, the coverage was raised from originally HK$ 100,000 to HK$500,000 
from the beginning of 2011.
142
 Therefore, in order to build up market discipline, the 
coverage limits should be established in covering the vast majority of small depositors 
the large depositors have incentive to monitor the bank activities.
143
 
 
However, this measure cannot guarantee that it always works in preventing banking 
crisis. An effective ex post compensation scheme cannot be fulfilled without a 
sufficient liquidation regime for insolvent banks. 
 
5.3. Insolvency Laws 
 
A special resolution regime for banks is crucial in the long run especially in the place 
where it has experienced bank failure. It includes cross-border bank insolvency, deposit 
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insurer’s extensive power to bank resolution and adoption of Key Attributes of 
effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions (‘Key Attributes’). They are 
going to be further discussed after introducing the Hong Kong circumstance in 
resolving internationally active banks. 
 
5.3.1. Experience of bank failure in Hong Kong 
 
According to the details discussed in Chapter 2.2, the experience has shown that bank 
run occurred after the bank insolvency in Hong Kong. It reflects that the deposit 
insurance scheme in Hong Kong is not sufficient to respond the banking crises. Public 
confidence cannot be effectively protected under the present compensation scheme. 
Hence, a special resolution regime for banks is necessary to liquidate the troubled 
banks in consideration of the public interest because banks is a special institution which 
should be differentiated from normal corporations as they have significant impact on 
the socio-economic development of a society.
144
   
 
However, the liquidation proceedings of Hong Kong banks, either local or foreign 
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subsidiaries, are in line with the ordinary companies.
 145
 They both are under the same 
rule stipulated in the Companies Ordinance
146
 and the Bankruptcy Ordinance
147
 
Moreover, in consideration of a gradually high interconnected and interdependence of 
banking systems in the world, Hong Kong legislators should raise the awareness the 
importance of international cooperation by adopting a proper cross-border insolvency 
regimes. 
 
5.3.2. International Cooperation and Coordination in cross-border bank 
insolvency  
 
As discussed above, most of the bank’s failure in Hong Kong are internationally active 
banks. In case of these foreign bank establishments fail, cross-border insolvency comes 
into consideration. However, Hong Kong does not adopt UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Cross-border Insolvency nor enacted any statutory provisions in recognizing the 
insolvency procedures commenced in foreign jurisdictions. Instead, recognition of a 
foreign insolvency proceeding is governed by common law.
148
 Generally, Hong Kong 
court will recognize a foreign liquidation or a foreign court sanctioned restructuring 
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arrangement and the appointment of a foreign representative of an insolvent company. 
However, Hong Kong courts have discretion to refuse if such recognition of foreign 
insolvency would be contrary to public policy, or in breach of the rules of natural justice, 
or to enforce a foreign panel or revenue law.
149
 
 
Two approaches have been considered to enhance the cooperation and coordination 
different countries in handling cross-border bank insolvency. UNCITRAL Model Law 
on Cross-border Insolvency was considered in the Hong Kong Consultation Paper on 
the Winding-Up Provisions of the Companies Ordinance in 1998. It is a framework that 
provides recognition, the consequences of recognition, cooperation and communication 
between courts. It aims to facilitate the cross-border insolvencies as to harmonize the 
legal approaches with different jurisdictions. It is to achieve justice and fairness despite 
of different approaches in different national insolvency laws, for instance, equal 
treatment to creditors and concurrent proceedings.
150
  
 
Nonetheless, the Sub-committee on Insolvency in Hong Kong expressed that they 
should exercise it with a degree caution and wait until a mature stage that is suitable for 
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Hong Kong.
151
 First, many jurisdictions have not adopted the Model Law. Second, 
even though it provides a framework, it leaves much discretion to the local court when 
any doubtful is raised. Different result may comes out in different courts and in 
different factors in common law or the Model Law. Third, the court might have the 
same law and rule in achieving the same purposes which are cross-border recognition 
and assistance. For instance, the UK has its common law and also the EU measures on 
the same function. Therefore, it is another question in dealing with the co-existence, 
such as replacement of the existing system or not.
152
 
 
Thus, Hong Kong should examine the existing system and figure out any improvement 
could be made through comparing it with the Model Law. Procedural justice and better 
communication between courts from different jurisdictions can be achieved if it is 
implemented through enacting legislation in regarding to the cross border insolvency 
rather than leaving much discretionary to the court. For instance, setting the ambit of 
provision of assistance.
153
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Another approach is suggested by Dr. Lastra, she considered the principles developed 
by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in relation to the cross-border 
supervision of branches and subsidiaries. She analyzed that the principles could deal 
with insolvency of banks which operating in different jurisdictions. According to the 
Basel Committee, there are two fundamental principles: no foreign banking 
establishment should escape supervision and the supervision should be adequate. 
Therefore, the host supervisors are responsible for the branches and subsidiaries of 
foreign banks operating in Hong Kong while the parent supervisors are responsible for 
the banking groups. Parent supervisors and host supervisors should inform each other 
in case of any serious problems arise in the subsidiaries or the parent bank. This kind of 
mutual co-operation between supervisory authorities should be analysed to apply in 
cross-border bank insolvency.
154
 
 
In short, Hong Kong is suggested to adopt the latter approach since it has been actively 
implementing Basel rules on supervising banks. It can facilitate the international 
cooperation between regulators from different jurisdiction on both ex ante and ex post 
measures. 
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5.3.3. Extensive power of bank resolution to deposit insurer 
 
Extending the power of deposit insurer for bank resolution is also another good way to 
insolvent the banks in consideration of the public interest. However, Hong Kong 
Deposit Protection Scheme (HKDPS) do not adopt this power. Its mandates for the 
HKDPS has been stated clearly in the Deposit Protection Scheme Ordinance
155
 that 
Deposit Protection Scheme should generally function as a ‘paybox’ type system which 
mainly forces on paying out depositors claims when a bank fails. Due to its mandate, 
the Scheme has little role in early detection and resolution of troubled banks, but have 
timely intervention of them. The Board of the Scheme works closely with Hong Kong 
Monetary Authority (HKMA), the Hong Kong banking regulator in regarding to ensure 
making compensation payments to depositors in an expeditious manner.
156
 
 
With the increasing international banking activities in Hong Kong, in particular after 
collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008, it is a suitable time for Hong Kong to make 
legislative reform in preventing future banking crises. Hong Kong should seek ways in 
enhance the mechanisms in dealing with failing or failed banks. Since deposit insurer 
                                                        
155 Cap. 581 
156 Hong Kong Deposit Protection Board, “Self-assessment on compliance with the Core Principles for 
Effective Deposit Insurance System recommended by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision” 
(2009) 
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will have a major impact on how the failed banks are resolved
157
, the role of HKDPS 
should play a role in the resolution of failed bank by taking depositors as the priority 
concern. Besides acting as a guarantee to the public deposits, HKDPS should be more 
independent that is insulated from undue political and industry influence.
158
    
 
International Association of Deposit Insurance (IADI) provides guidance on enhancing 
the mechanism for the resolution of failed banks. The power of the deposit insurer is not 
only payout the deposits to the depositors in a timely and orderly way, but also the 
ability to intervene early for inspection of troubled banks and to conduct resolution of 
failed banks in appropriate approach. It also promotes a good check and balance system 
with other regulators. Good coordination between local regulators and cross-border 
authorities is necessary if it is cross-border bank insolvency.159 
 
In the U.S., the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (‘FDIC’) has been given power 
to address the problems of large and complex financial institutions which can pose 
systemic risk.
160
 This power is come from Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
                                                        
157 International Association of Deposit Insurers, “Guidance of Bank Resolution of bank failure” (5 
December 2005) 3 
158
 ibid 
159 Ibid p.37-48 
160 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Bank of England, “Resolving Globally Active, 
Systemically Important, Financial Institutions”(2012) < 
http://www.fdic.gov/about/srac/2012/gsifi.pdf > accessed 18 August 2013, 2 
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Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (‘Dodd-Frank Act’) which greatly increases the 
ability of regulators to address the problems of or exercise resolution powers to the 
financial institutions which have significant effect to financial stability. Such strategy is 
to assign losses to shareholders and unsecured creditors of the holding company, and 
transfer sound operating subsidiaries to new solvent entities. Title I of the Dodd-Frank 
Act requires each large and complex financial institution to submit a resolution plan 
which is according to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code to FDIC and Federal Reserve. The 
plan is reviewed and examined. The approved plan will facilitate the exercising FDIC’s 
resolution power to undertake an orderly resolution under bankruptcy in the event of 
failure.
161
 
 
Bank resolution power is delegated to FDIC under the Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act to 
resolve the financial institutions which might pose systemic risk and cause financial 
instability. Any losses of the failed financial institutions should not be borne by 
taxpayers, but the senior management and shareholders. FDIC is required to carry out 
the resolution that is to minimize the risk of financial stability and moral hazard. Any 
costs in resolving the company will be recovered by the industry.
162
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If Hong Kong has to adopt this approach, the structural reform has to be conducted in 
HKDPS from its “paybox” to “non-paybox” regime.  
 
5.3.4. Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions 
(‘Key Attribute’) 
 
Key Attribute is a guideline set by Financial Stability Board (FSB) in November 
2011.
163
 It provides a framework for implementation of effective resolutions regime of 
all jurisdictions for any financial institution which is systemically significant.
164
 It 
allows authorities to resolve the financial institutions in an orderly manner. The power 
also includes the ability to override the rights of shareholders, replace the management 
who is responsible for the loss. It can also transfer the critical functions of a failing firm 
to a bridge firm, so the critical and main function of the firm keeps operating which 
aims at not to affect the financial stability. Such transition is also suitable for 
cross-border nature of the financial institution where its subsidiaries in foreign 
countries are still working under control as to minimize the global systemic risk.
165
 By 
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converting the unsecured debt into equity from senior creditors of a failed company, 
failing financial firm will be recapitalized and thus the bailed-in creditors will become 
the owners of the resolved firm. As a result, such approach can maintain the financial 
stability without cost to taxpayers.
166
  
 
In addition, the Key Attribute also puts emphasis on the coordination of the 
cross-border resolution authorities with the consideration of the impact of their 
resolution actions on the financial stability of foreign jurisdictions and helps to ensure 
the local resolution authorities to support the resolution conducted by a foreign 
authority. Therefore, a close cooperation between local and foreign authorities is 
crucial.
167
 
 
5.3.4.1. Difficulties in implementation of Key Attribute 
 
According to the peer review on resolution regimes published by FSB on 11 April 2013, 
some FSB jurisdictions have implemented the Key Attributes in their reforms of 
resolution regimes. The problem they have encountered is that the resolution 
                                                        
166 Permanent Bureau, “Should the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International 
Law start Preliminary work on Cross-border Aspects relating to resolution?” (Netherlands, April 
2013) 2-3 
167 ibid 
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authorities are lack of important powers in resolving systematic institutions, such as the 
power to bail in. In addition, they also lack of power in controlling the parent company 
and its subsidiaries of a failed financial institution, and the powers in resolving 
systematic non-bank institutions, for instance, financial market infrastructure providers. 
There are also insufficient procedures for giving effect to foreign resolution actions or 
for domestic authorities to share confidential information. Furthermore, there is a lack 
of power in demanding firms to make changes to their organizational and financial 
structures in order to facilitate the process of insolvency.
168
  
 
5.3.5. Hong Kong situation 
 
Hong Kong does not adopt the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-border Insolvency, 
Key Attributes and any resolution power given to deposit insurer under HKDPS to 
early intervene the bank resolution and carry out resolution. Moreover, there is an 
absence of special resolution regime or insolvency regime for Hong Kong branches of 
foreign banks; they can only process their insolvency under corporate insolvency 
proceedings. In addition, Hong Kong regulators, MA and SFC both have the power to 
appoint a special manager to take over the affairs and business of a failing company in 
                                                        
168 Financial Stability Board, “FSB publishes peer review on resolution regimes” (Press release, 11 April 
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Student No.: 1340727 
Banking Crises and Hong Kong: Regulatory Measures and Compensation Schemes 
(Bailout, Deposit Insurance and Insolvency Laws) 
67 
 
 
 
the commencement of administrative proceedings.169 
 
Compare to the international standard of resolution regimes, Hong Kong has yet met 
any of them, despite the fact that it is an international financial centre which has 
thousands of banks dealing with millions of banking activities every day. Any collapse 
of foreign banks might adversely affect the stability of the Hong Kong financial system. 
Therefore, legislator and policymaker should raise awareness of the international 
compensation regimes in order to produce a comprehensive compensation system for 
boosting the public confidence in banks and foreign investment in Hong Kong. 
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6. CHAPTER SIX: Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, understanding the fact that regulatory response towards the global 
financial crises is national and insufficient; more effort has to be put on international 
cooperation with other international organizations, such as Basel Committee, IOSCO, 
IAIS and FSB to conduct regulatory reforms with international standards. Moreover, 
cooperation is not only among developed countries, but also developing countries. Peer 
pressure is beneficial in resolving the financial crisis collectively on the basis of mutual 
benefits they can get on each other, either in the form of private return or building up 
good international relationship. 
 
In spite of the united response towards the financial crises in Hong Kong, the financial 
regulatory system is too simple compared to the complexity of the crises. For ex ante 
measures, the conduct of business at the point of sale has to be improved through 
legislations. The roles between regulators have to be clear and should work out the most 
effective way for enforcement. Strengthen supervision and increased coordination is 
necessary to detect problems, so investigations can be conducted as early as possible to 
undertaking proper enforcement. 
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For ex post measures, Hong Kong does not have special scheme or law in the area of 
cross-border bank insolvency. International cooperation between regulatory authorities 
is necessary. Giving extensive power to deposit insurer in resolving bank failure is one 
of the good suggestions to HKDPS. It motivates deposit insurer to get involve in 
detecting any troubled banks and carry on investigation. It is necessary to refer to the 
guidelines of effective bank resolution from IADI, the Key Attributes from FSB, as 
well as the example of Dodd Frank Act in the U.S. 
 
By obtaining a comprehensive compensation system, Hong Kong can be prepared to 
against the negative influence from any banking crisis. It can also enhance the financial 
stability in Hong Kong. Thus, it is proposed that if a good regime of bank resolution is 
implemented, the perception of “too big to fail” theory can be minimized. The regime 
should aim at resolving the banks without affecting the banking stability and the 
socio-economic environment of a country while leaving the risky investors or 
management to take their responsibilities for the financial loss, but not the depositors 
and taxpayers.  
 
Such practice is beneficial to the health of the banking system that promotes efficiency 
of the market and market discipline. If the troubled bank is always rescued by 
Student No.: 1340727 
Banking Crises and Hong Kong: Regulatory Measures and Compensation Schemes 
(Bailout, Deposit Insurance and Insolvency Laws) 
70 
 
 
 
government bailout, it is unfairness to taxpayers. More importantly, it may encourage 
moral hazard problem which levers the degree of the crises. 
 
The harmonious relationship between regulation and compensation schemes has to be 
achieved in order to attain comprehensive preventive measures against banking crises. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision set out rules in gaining mutual cooperation 
and coordination between local and foreign financial regulatory supervisors. 
International cooperation has to be attained in supervising the international banking 
system and also in dealing with cross-border bank insolvency. 
 
Hong Kong is an international financial centre with more than thousand of local and 
foreign banks operating and conducting banking activities. A comprehensive financial 
regulation and compensation scheme is utmost important since Hong Kong is 
renowned for her banking and finance industry. Not only does the Hong Kong public 
have the confidence in banking system, but also it attracts foreign banks and financial 
institutions station here which can boost the economy in Hong Kong. 
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